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Abstract—With the increase of centralization of resources
in IT-infrastructure and the growing amount of cloud services,
database management systems (DBMS) will be more and more
outsourced to Infrastructure-as-a-Service (IaaS) providers. The
outsourcing of entire databases, or the computation power for
processing Big Data to an external provider also means that
the provider has full access to the information contained in
the database. In this article we propose a feasible solution with
Order-Preserving Encryption (OPE) and further, state of the art,
encryption methods to sort and process Big Data on external
resources without exposing the unencrypted data to the IaaS
provider. We also introduce a proof-of-concept client for Google
BigQuery as example IaaS Provider.
I. INTRODUCTION TO ORDER PRESERVING ENCRYPTION
Cloud Computing has reached to be one of the corner-
stones in IT-Infrastructure during the last years. Especially
the outsourcing of databases is one main service and has
been proposed in several publications. [1], [2], [3], [4], [5],
[6], [7] The idea to use complex networking and computing
infrastructure as a service is reasonable but has its limitations.
[8], [9] An external platform of data storage has to be treated as
untrusted. Encryption is a powerful technology for protecting
the confidentiality of the data stored but needs to be decrypted
for processing. One approach is to use encryption which allows
operations on encrypted data. Fully Homomorphic Encryption
(FHE) and Order-Preserving Symmetric Encryption (OPE) are
relevant approaches to solve this dilemma with encryption
algorithms. As OPE maintains the order of the encrypted
data obtained, data can be compared on the encrypted system
and are thus sorted. Since the comparison of data is already
sufficient to run a significant amount of common operations on
the remote database system, this method fullfills two important
prerequisites for the outsourcing of DBMS: Data can not only
be securely stored, but also processed on a remote system.
Because of this quality, OPE is primarily used in databases
for processing SQL queries over encrypted data [10], [11],
[12], [9], [13], [14], [15], [16], [17], [18]. The concept of
OPE is subject of research since a number of years and
secure algorithms were found. [10], [17], [19] The challenge
for researchers is to develop a feasible solution for relevant
use cases of secure data processing. Some of the most recent
aspects are considered and evaluated in this work.
In the context of the outsourcing process of computing
power and services to external, untrusted systems, Fully Ho-
momorphic Encryption is an alternative to OPE. In contrast
to OPE, FHE offers the advantage that the homomorphic
property of the encrypted data is retained. Thus, an OPE
scheme only guarantees that comparison’s plaintext space
(x > y) has the same result as those obtained in the encrypted
space (Enc (x) > Enc (y)). In FHE, computation of more
sequential operations on encrypted data are possible. Recent
work on FHE has shown it is, in principal, possible the
perform arbitrary computations over encrypted data [20], the
performance overheads are prohibitively high, on the order of
109 times [10], [21]. Both procedures have their specific use
case and can be used together. In this work we focus on OPE
as we are mainly interested in the option to sort data on the
untrusted IaaS-Platform.
Different OPE algorithms with specific characteristics are
known [11], [22], [23], [10]. Mutable Order-Preserving Encod-
ing (mOPE), a special form of OPE, is introduces by Ada Popa
et. al. in [10]. With mOPE, the data on the server is encoded
in a binary search tree (see fig. 1). The server provides the
encrypted data stored in a binary tree and the OPE encoding
path. The plaintext shown behind the encrypted cipher text
(see fig. 1) is not known to the server and is provided with the
purpose of the readers’ information.
For our implementation we use AES, an existing deter-
ministic encryption algorithm with a constant initialization
vector. The encrypted data is represented in a binary tree,
in such a way that the right child node is growing and
the left one is decreasing. For all commercial IaaS NoSQL
providers, it is not possible to implement own methods and
algorithms for storing data. mOPE can be modified and used
in a IaaS NoSQL scenario without losing security or ordering
qualities. As proven in [10] the only information revealed of
the encrypted data is the order and hence the needed minimum
of additional exposure. Due to the high security and simplicity
this algorithm has been chosen for the following application
scenario. The objective of this work is to propose a way to
use the secure OPE algorithm mOPE on a cloud platform.
The adaption of the mOPE algorithm is not possible without
changing the way, data will be encrypted and sent to the
cloud database due to the fact that cloud databases works in a
different manner. In this work we discuss different challenges
and possible solutions processing Big Data in a fast way by
many clients.
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Fig. 1. Datastructure overview of mOPE [10]
II. USING ORDER-PRESERVING ENCRYPTION ON BIG
DATA
There are different reasons for storing big amounts of data
on potential untrusted databaseses, such as autonomous cars,
intelligent homes or smart grids. However, Big Data is not
restricted to new, expensive applications of big corporations,
but Big Data can be acquired, also from small companies [24].
Big Data, being generally unstructured and heterogeneous, is
extremely complex to deal with via traditional approaches,
and requires real-time or almost real-time analysis. [25] In
our scenario, Big Data needs to be accessed from many
applications or users and be processed in a fast way. This
is a widely used scenario for any kind of data. To work
with Big Data also includes the use of NoSQL Databases,
because of the major advantages in processing a high amount
of data in a fast way. A NoSQL database system is a database
without a relational data model. NoSQL is perfectly suited
for processing Big Data, because of the horizontal scaling.
Contrary to vertical scaling (e.g. SQL-Server), where a single
note needs to be upgraded to get more computation power,
horizontal scaling simply needs more nodes. [26] This model
is cost efficient and can be combined with an IaaS model. Thus,
extremely large data can be processed in a fast way. Due to
the use of programming models like MapReduce [27], which
is used in several NoSQL Databases, the processing of Big
Data is feasible possible. With OPE on a scalable cost efficient
NoSQL resource, no expensive infrastructure is needed and the
external resource is capable of a secure analysis of Big Data.
III. THE INFRASTRUCTURE OF MUTABLE
ORDER-PRESERVING ENCRYPTION ON
GOOGLE BIGQUERY
To order and encrypt data the plaintext has to be known
to the system encrypting it. Because this work can not be
outsourced to an untrusted service, we use a central proxy
configuration. Figure 2 despicts our concept for order pre-
serving encryption in an IaaS infrastructure. The concept of
encryption includes an encryption proxy, an NoSQL-like IaaS
and n clients. The encryption proxy gets a Big Data chunk
as input. The proxy orders and encrypts the data by using
private keys. In this concept, it is also possible to use different
encryption algorithms and keys for different columns of the
data. The encryption proxy in between the Big Data and
the IaaS provider is necessary, so no additional information
besides the order will be revealed to any external resources.
The keys, used to encrypt and decrypt the data, will be kept
secret. The sorted and encrypted data will then be sent to
the external service. Once the data is uploaded, many clients
can perform analyses on it. In general, there is nearly no
limitation on the clients or the complexity of the queries,
because of the horizontal scaling of NoSQL Databases. The
clients themselves can have different privileges. In the example
configuration in figure 2, the client can have access to the
secret keys. This is not necessary to perform queries on the
data. If they do have the secret keys of the encryption proxy,
the full range of analysis is possible. It may be possible that
encrypted and unencrypted data are present in a single dataset.
A client who does not possess the secret keys, can still perform
analysis on unencrypted data. This scenario is conceivable, if
some of the data in a dataset is public or available unencrypted.
The unencrypted data can then complement the encrypted
data by providing additional information and might be useful
to perform other analyses. This concept allows several other
security models and it is also possible to extend the concept
for using different keys for different clients. With this concept,
we have created a way to use the powerful computation power
of the cloud-service Google BigQuery by many clients but not
revealing information about the data, which will be stored in
the database. Furthermore, due to the use of different keys,
a highly granular rights management for the clients is also
possible which can access different information without using
or implementing any rights- management on the IaaS provider
side.
A. Limitations on Order-Preserving Encryption for Big Data
Big Data usually implies that the amount of data cannot be
processed by a single machine as the proxy in the described
concept (see fig. 2). Also, the Big Data chunk will usually
grow over time. This limitation does not only apply in this
scenario, but is present every time, the order of encrypted data
is needed. If new data will be added, the already encrypted
and sorted data needs to be read from the external resource,
decrypted, and sorted again. Outsourcing this operation to the
external IaaS Provider does also reveal the private key to this
provider. For security reasons, this approach is not possible.
The concept we use offers the possibility to access data very
fast because of the high power of the IaaS provider but still
needs high computational power or time for encrypting the
data on the encryption proxy.
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Fig. 2. Concept of Order-Preserving Encrypiton on Google BigData as example IaaS provider
B. Solving the Limitations
To solve the limitation on ordering and encrypting Big
Data, we propose different approaches:
• Using a high sorting range: A resorting and reen-
cryption is just needed if the plain text space size
(domain) reaches a collision in the mapped sorting
items (range). Then a new item cannot be sorted to
the right position because of creating a collision. This
can be prevented by choosing a much higher range-
space. A resorting and reencryption is more unlikely.
• Partial encryption: In many cases, Big Data consists
of a mixture of public and private data. Only when pri-
vate data and public data are brought into relationship,
the public data is interesting for a potential attacker. A
distinction has to be drawn between data that should
be kept secret and data, which is public available. This
can lead to a major decrease of the encrypted data by
simply using an intelligent encryption schema on the
Big Data.
• Use of diverse encryption algorithms: One data
chunk consists of various kinds of data, with different
claims on encryption. In order to know the right
algorithm, the plaintext data needs to be analysed.
If, for example, sorting is irrelevant because a data
chunk contains the name of patients, this data can be
encrypted with an probabilistic algorithm. This proce-
dure can be parallelised and will affect the resources
of the encryption proxy less.
• Separating data chunks on server and merging
it on client side: We proposed an import of the
Big Data as chunks. Assuming the returned queries
results are significant smaller than the particular data
chunk, the uploaded data chunks can be uploaded in
different tables. A query then will be applied to the
different chunks and the client will merge the much
smaller results locally. By using this approach it is not
necessary to reencrypt already uploaded chunks. If the
fragmentation grows over time, a garbage collection
can merge data chunks, reencrypt those and upload it
again to the service to lower the tables on server side.1
Additional approaches for solving the limitation can be the
use of local NoSQL structures for the encryption and sorting
proxy or the decreasing of the amount of data by just using
the needed columns for OPE. [28]
IV. GOOGLE BIGQUERY AS EXAMPLE IAAS PROVIDER
Google BigQuery is a system, designed to perform SQL-
Like statements over Big Data. Google BigQuery can query
1TBs [24] and returns the result of the particular SQL state-
ment. To achieve this, BigQuery uses different techniques of
storing and processing data. They are based on several main
systems, like BigTable, a forerunner of the NoSQL Database
used at Google, or Megastore, a geographically replicated,
consistent NoSQL-type datastore. Megastore uses the Paxos
algorithm to ensure consistent reads and writes. [24]
The cloud service of Google utilises the Dremel Engine, a
distributed SQL query engine, to perform complex queries over
Big Data. [29] This engine uses two technologies to achieve
the goal of 1TBs : Colossus, a large, parallel, distributed file
system and ColumnIO, a storage format which arranges the
data in a manner that makes it easier to query over this data.
[24]
The Dremel Engine makes use of the Dremel Serving Tree
algorithm to run the query on a distributed system. [29] The
possible parallelisation of SQL- like queries is depending on
the complexity of these queries. In most operations, the SQL
query will be distributed to many workers (shards) and mixers.
These different nodes will process the SQL query in parallel
and are returning the result.
V. ENCRYPTED BIGQUERY COMMAND LINE INTERFACE
Google BigQuery offers a powerful asynchronous API
to access the resources provided by Google. In addition,
Google has released a beta client written in Python which is
using encryption based on [17] called ”Encrypted Big Query
Command-Line Tool” (ebq). [30]
1This solution is only adequate if Big Data chunks are uploaded and the
fragmentation is not too high.
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To provide data for the CLI, the plaintext table data
needs to be stored either as comma-separated values (CSV) or
JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) file. The definition, which
encryption should be used on which data, needs to be provided
in a second scheme file. This extended table schema is pro-
vided by the user, where the extended schema is a modification
of the BigQuery scheme. The unmodified ebq-client supports
Paillier’s homomorphic encryption algorithm [31], as well as
probabilistic, pseudonym and different searchword algorithms.
[28] To support Order-Preserving encryption, the client has
been modified and a new encryption scheme is implemented.
The CLI is used as encryption proxy and is sorting the
data, using ”timsort”, a hybrid stable sorting algorithm, with
a best case performance of O (n), average and worst case
performance of O (n log n). The plaintext will be encrypted
using AES with CBC/PKCS5 Padding. The client uses a
simple implementation as proof of concept. The encrypted data
and the decimal order value will written together to a column
separated by an special character. In addition to for research
purpose, the order is also written to a separate column.
All encrypted data is stored in a temporary file. If the data-
encryption and -sorting is finished, the file will be uploaded by
using the API of Google BigQuery. The private key will not be
transmitted to the external source. BigQuery uses a RESTful
API and the Transport-Layer- Security (TLS) protocol to
communicate encrypted with the client. The packages sent to
the API are lossless compressed with gzip using the deflate
algorithm. By using the compression, the data transfer can be
sped up by +50-75%, depending on the size and the quality
of the data.
We have implemented Order-Preserving Encryption based
on the mOPE Algorithm. Based on the modification, the ebq
client is now capable of using a high range of different
encryption algorithms including OPE for Big Data.
The in-depth analysis of the modified beta client in [28]
has been investigated on different components of the client
to detect possible impediments of the encryption. We have
reviewed the resource and time consumption of uploading,
query processing, sorting and encrypting. The analysis has
proven that the bottle neck for the encrypted BigQuery client is
the encryption of new data before uploading it to the external
service. Due to the compression, the upload time for new
data is relatively low, compared to the time consumption of
the encryption. For sampling we used simulated credit card
information with a sample size from 103 to 107 samples. Com-
paring the time consumption for ordering and encrypting the
samples on the encryption proxy to uploading and preparing
the data on Google BigQuery, has shown that the API runtime
period is about 100 times faster than the proxy. These samples
also have been tested with complex SELECT and ORDER BY
statements. The response time for queries was in any test case
less then 10 seconds2, even when returning 106 query results.
Considering Big Data, we have also evaluated that standard
state of the art client laptop3 can work with encrypted Big
2The higher time consumption is caused by the asynchronous API of
Google BigQuery. The client will send an asynchronous call to the GBQ API.
Depending on the load of the API at the moment, the calls will be processed
one by one.
3Intel Core i7-5600 4x2.60GHz; 16 GB RAM; Arch Linux (Kernel: 4.6.2);
Python 2.7.11
Data. We focused on the encryption as bottle neck for resource
consumption. For this examination we have extracted the
encryption method used in our modified ebq client and sampled
it with random 16 digit integer values, simulating credit card
numbers. Table I shows a linear correlation in the equivalent
file size of the unencrypted data in order to the sample size
as well as a linear correlation in time consumption for the
encryption in order to the sample size. The sample scenario
confirmed our expectation of extremely fast responses once the
data is uploaded to the external system but also shows, that
basic workstations can work with an extreme high amount of
data in a reasonable time.
TABLE I. Sample sizes for the encryption validation
Sample Size Digits Equivalent File Size Time Consumption
1.000 16 25.9 kB 0.0034 s
10.000 16 268.9 kB 0.0214 s
100.000 16 2.8 MB 0.2035 s
1.000.000 16 28.9 MB 2.0432 s
10.000.000 16 298.9 MB 21.7537 s
VI. CONCLUSION, FUTURE WORK AND DISCUSSION
We demonstrated that it is possible to use external resources
without decreasing the level of security more than the theo-
retically necessary minimum of Order-Preserving Encryption.
With the imperative requirement of revealing the order of
the encrypted data, it is possible to work with the data on
the external resource, but to maintain the secrecy of private
data. With the introduction of a new concept, which depicts to
work with encryption on an external resource and by using the
modified encrypted BigQuery client, it is feasible to encrypt
andsort Big Data using any symmetric encryption algorithm.
We have also combined widely used algorithms and state of the
art encryption to work with modern Infrastructure-as-a-Service
environment. OPE is still a new technology and should be
used with care but offers already a feasible way to protect
confidentiality. Further work will focus on overcoming the
remaining limitations, using the client as encryption proxy.
We plan to implement recent algorithm to hide the user’s
query distribution and by that making it even harder to reveal
information besides the order.
With our solution it is possible to handle modern Big Data
use cases. Even if, in first place, data is not considered as
Big. If a system collecting timestamped GPS data produces a
million records a day, it might not be Big Data. In three years,
however, the system will have created a billion records. Data
processing over a long period of time is important to detect
the development or periodic trends. Often, the amount or the
length back in time is important and will produce better results
the more data sets are available. [24] This example shows, that
a slower encryption but a fast analysis on the data by many
clients is feasible and convenient for modern databases.
We have proposed different encryption algorithms which
can be used with our concept besides Order-Preserving En-
cryption. Different data in a dataset does need different en-
cryption algorithms depending on the projected queries and
operations. This does have an impact on the design of the
database scheme and can increases data security. With the
modified ebq-client, the full range of algorithms and therefore
operations is possible.
4
Recent work by Mavroforakis et. al. [19] has revisited
the Modular Order-Preserving Encryption (MOPE) Algorithm
[23]. MOPE is slightly different to mOPE, but is is also
possible for a external database service to gain more infor-
mation besides the order by observing the user’s queries. In
[19] the author discusses three contributions to hide the user’s
query distribution by mixing it with another distribution. The
described methods are possible, but are not implemented yet
in the proof of concept client of this work.
For high security needs, it is also possible to use Oblivious
RAM (ORAM). ORAM is a technique that hides all infor-
mation about which positions in an outsourced database are
accessed by the client, by continually shuffling around and re-
encrypting the data. [32], [33], [19]. Considering [19] ORAM
is less efficient and the proposed solutions more sufficient for
OPE.
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